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Abstract 
 
Pursuant to its 2008 Stabilization and Association Agreement governing the process of EU 
integration Serbia is obliged to align its consumer protection standards with those of the EU. 
As part of this process in 2010 it adopted a new Consumer Protection Act that, inter alia, 
implements the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. This article compares the Serbian and 
European fairness regimes laid down in the tests of fairness, highlighting the advantages of 
the Serbian test. It argues that the Serbian test is preferable particularly because it resolves the 
saga on the relation between substantive and procedural fairness, and it allows the application 
of the test during performance of the contract. As a final note the paper highlights the 
potential dangers that may undermine the positive effects of the test and leave consumers 
unprotected. 
 
Key words: unfair contract terms, consumer protection, European law, Serbian law  
 
 
 
I. I1TRODUCTIO1 
 
In 2008 Serbia signed and ratified the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(hereinafter: SAA), thereby formally commencing the process of European integration. The 
SAA provides a conditional guarantee of membership of the European Union (hereinafter: 
EU), subject to fulfilment of a number of conditions, including harmonization of the 
economic law of Serbia with that of the EU, including consumer protection standards.1  
When the SAA was signed, the then-existing Consumer protection act of 20052 that 
represented the first attempt at harmonization3 was not in line with EU consumer acquis.4 It 
                                                 
1 See for more: G. Papović, A. Feješ (Fejős), “The Role of Stabilization and Association Agreement in 
Consumer Protection” (Uloga Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju u zaštiti potrošača), Izazovi evropskih 
integracija, 1/2008, 45-60. 
2 Zakon o zaštiti potrošača, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 79/2005. This act replaced the first 
“modern” consumer protection act, the Consumer Protection Act of 2002 (Zakon o zaštiti potrošača), Official 
Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 37/2002.  
3 T. Jovanić, “Consumer Protection Law and Policy in Serbia: The Current State and Projections for the Future”, 
The Yearbook of Consumer Law (eds. C. Twigg-Flesner et al), Ashgate, Aldershot 2008, 467. 
4 J. Czuczai, Final Report on Assessment of EU Consistency of Serbia/Montenegro Regulatory Framework for 
Consumer Protection, PLAC, Belgrade-Podgorica,2006, 18-21. Cf  Ibid. 
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left out, inter alia, the regulation of unfair contract terms. Protection against unfair terms in 
consumer contracts was provided for by a set of general clauses protecting the weaker party, 
and by special provisions on standard contract terms in the Law of obligations act of 1978 
(hereinafter: LOA).56  
The creation of a legal and institutional framework for consumer protection intensified 
after signing the SAA and a completely new Consumer protection act of 2010 (hereinafter: 
CPA)7 was adopted. The CPA is a comprehensive act, containing both substantive and 
procedural rules. Modeled after France and Italy8 it is lex specialis for B2C contracts, whereas 
the LOA continues to apply as lex generalis. The CPA is in line with the EU consumer 
acquis.
9
 Among the 15 EU directives it also implements the Directive on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts
10  (hereinafter: UCTD). Importantly, the CPA for the first time 
specifically regulates unfair terms in consumer contracts in Serbian law.11  
Taking advantage of the minimal character of the UCTD (Article 8 UCTD), the CPA 
took a wider approach to the regulation of unfair terms than suggested by the UCTD.12 The 
objective of the paper is to compare the Serbian and European fairness regimes laid down in 
the tests of fairness, and particularly to highlight the advantages of the Serbian test in the CPA 
compared to the European test in the UCTD.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Zakon o obligacionim odnosima, Official Gazette of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Nos. 
29/78, 39/85, 45/89, 57/89; Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 31/93; Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Serbia, No. 1/03. 
6 For an analysis of the LOA from the angle of consumer protection see: M. Đurđević, Protection of consumers 
by general rules of contract conclusion (Zaštita potrošača prema opštim pravilima o zaključenju ugovora), Pravo 
i privreda, 1-4/2009, 271-286. 
7 Zakon o zaštiti potrošača, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 73/10. The English translation of the 
CPA is available at: http://www.zapotrosace.rs/CMS/download/law-on-consumer-protection-republic-of-
serbia.pdf, last visited 27 September 2013. 
8M. Karanikić Mirić, „What is new in Serbian consumer (contract) law?“ (Šta je novo u Srpskom (ugovornom) 
potrošačkom pravu?), 5 Legal capacities of Serbia for European integrations (Pravni kapacitet Srbije za 
evropske integracije) (ed. S. Lilić), Faculty of Law, Belgrade 2010, 129. 
9 See for analysis: A. Fejős, The Reform of Consumer Legislation in Serbia (Reforma potrošačkog 
zakonodavstva u Srbiji), Social Challenges of European Integrations: Serbia and Comparative Experiences, 
(Društveni izazovi evropskih integracija – Srbija i uporedna iskustva), Faculty of Legal and Business 
Studies, Novi Sad 2010, 128-147. 
10 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, No. L 95/29, 21 April 1993, 29–34. 
11 It should be noted that in September 2013 the Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and 
Telecommunications responsible for consumer protection put forward the draft of the new CPA for public 
discussion. The test of fairness in the draft remains unchanged. See: http://mtt.gov.rs/vesti/javna-rasprava-o-
nacrtu-zakona-o-zastiti-potrosaca/?lang=lat, last visited 27 September 2013. 
12 The test of fairness in Article 46(2) CPA is modelled after Article 24(1) Consumer Protection Act of the 
Republic of Slovenia (Zakon o varstvu potrošnikov, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 20/98, 
23/99, 110/02, 14/03, 51/04, 98/04, 46/06, 126/07, 86/09, 78/11). Personal conversation with M. Karanikić-
Mirić, 12 April 2012. 
II. THE CO1CEPT OF (U1)FAIR1ESS I1 SERBIA1 A1D EUROPEA1 
LAW 
 
The Serbian test of fairness in Article 46(2) CPA, says that: “A contract term is unfair 
if it:  1) results in a significant imbalance in contractual obligations of the parties to the 
detriment of the consumer; 2) causes the execution of a contract to be burdensome to the 
consumer without a justifiable reason; 3) causes the execution of a contract to be substantially 
different from what the consumer legitimately expected; 4) violates the transparency 
requirements of the business; 5) violates the principle of good faith. 
This provision implements the European test of fairness set out in Art. 3(1) UCTD: “A 
contractual term which have not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”   
At first sight it can be noticed the test of fairness in the CPA is broader than the test in 
the UCTD. In both tests contract terms are unfair for being contrary to the principle of good 
faith, and causing a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations; although the 
paper will show that the problem with the UCTD (but not the CPA) is that it is not clear what 
the relationship is between these two general. Moreover, the CPA goes further than the UCTD 
and explicitly provides that terms may be unfair for being contrary to what the consumer 
legitimately expected under the contract; making the performance unjustifiably burdensome 
for the consumer; or for not being transparent. The paper further analyzes these points 
separately. 
 
II.1. GOOD FAITH A1D SIG1IFICA1T IMBALA1CE I1 THE 
PARTIES’ RIGHTS A1D OBLIGATIO1S 
 
The basic concept of unfairness in the UCTD is determined by reference to general 
clauses of good faith and significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations. Besides 
difficulties in determining the precise meaning of the two clauses, the most important 
question under the UCTD is the relation of the general clauses to each other. 
Brownsword et al highlight at least four different interpretations: 1) a term is unfair if 
it causes i) a significant imbalance ii) to the detriment of the consumer. In this interpretation 
the significant imbalance defines violation of good faith, so the latter is not a separate 
requirement; 2) a contract term is unfair if it causes i) a significant imbalance, ii) to the 
detriment of the consumer; iii) it is contrary to the requirement of good faith. Here, the 
requirement of good faith is an independent, procedural condition. 3) a contract term is unfair 
if it causes i) a significant imbalance, ii) to the detriment of the consumer; iii) it is contrary to 
the requirement of good faith. The requirement of good faith is an independent, substantive 
condition. 4) a contract term is unfair if it causes i) a significant imbalance, ii) to the detriment 
of the consumer; iii) it is contrary to the requirement of good faith. The requirement of good 
faith is an independent, substantive and procedural condition.13 
The correct answer to the above question is that there is no good answer. As the 
UCTD is a result of a compromise between Member States with different contract law 
traditions, the clause leaves room for interpretation. For example one key issue is whether the 
two criteria are completely separate or whether the “significant imbalance” is part of the 
general criteria of good faith, and national courts approach this differently. Italian courts are 
inclined to assimilate good faith into significant imbalance. A common formula used in 
decision making is that a term is unfair because it creates a significant imbalance in the 
parties’ rights and obligations and which is sufficient to render the term unfair.14  On the 
contrary, the House of Lords in First ;ational Bank v. Director General of Fair Trading took 
the view that the two principles are connected but separate requirements.15 
Consensus is also absent among academics. There is a view that good faith is not an 
independent criterion.16 Consequently, significant imbalance automatically triggers the 
violation of good faith.17 This view relies on the idea that the key reason for good faith being 
part of the test was to reflect those national traditions that were tied to the good faith concept. 
In this regard good faith can be viewed simply as a label that “explains” to these national 
traditions what is meant by the significant imbalance.18 Nevertheless, as Willett points out, 
this standpoint is difficult to uphold. Recital 16 UCTD contains explicit and separate 
                                                 
13 R. Brownsword, G. Howells, T. Wilhelmsson, “Between Market and Welfare: Some Reflections on Article 3 
of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts”, Aspects of Fairness in Contract (ed. C. Willett), 
Blackstone, London 1996, 31-32. 
14 P. Nebbia, Unfair Contract Terms in European Law: A Study in Comparative and EC Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford-Portland-Oregon 2007, 151. 
15 First ;ational Bank v. Director General of Fair Trading, 25 October 2001, [2001] 3 WRL 1297. Lord 
Bingham at 1307-8.  For analysis see: C. Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms, 
Ashgate, Aldershot 2007, 177-216. 
16 M. Teneiro, “The Community Directive on Unfair Terms and National Legal Systems”, European Review of 
Private Law, 2/1995, 273, 279. 
17 C. Willett, “The functions of transparency in regulating contract terms: UK and Australian approaches”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2/2011, 363. 
18 Ibid. 
guidelines on good faith.19 It follows that the violation of good faith is at least to some extent 
an independent requirement (whether independent from significant imbalance or, with the 
same practical result, playing some independent role in determining when an imbalance is 
“significant”).20 This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter: CJEU). In Aziz v Catalunyacaixa21 the CJEU ruled that in order 
to determine if a term causes “significant imbalance” the default rules of the applicable 
national law should be taken into account.22 However, as derogation from default rules will 
not in itself automatically make contract terms unfair, according to the CJEU, in order to 
assess if the significant imbalance arises “contrary to the requirement of good faith”, it must 
be determined whether the business could reasonably assume that the consumer would have 
agreed to the term if the term would be subject of individual negotiations.23 In other words, 
the CJEU confirmed good faith is at least to some extent a separate requirement playing some 
independent role in determining when an imbalance is “significant.” 
The issue on the relation between the two general clauses also raises the question of 
the relationship between procedural and substantive fairness. 
“Substantive fairness” relates to fairness of the contract terms themselves, fairness of 
the substance of the terms.24 One way of starting to analyze substantive fairness of a contract 
term would be unfair if it deviates form the default rules and from reasonable expectations of 
the consumer.25  
“Procedural fairness” means fairness in the process leading up to the agreement.26 It 
is connected to fair and open dealing, and is in place to prevent unfair surprise and lack of 
choice.27 The concept of procedural fairness is broader than the legibility and other 
transparency aspects of the terms of the contract. It encompasses choice between alternative 
terms offered and bargaining power. Therefore, the assessment of procedural fairness includes 
an evaluation as to whether a consumer had a reasonable opportunity to get acquainted with 
the contract term, if it was presented in plain and intelligible language, if the consumer 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 364. 
20 Ibid. 
21 C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa), 11 March 
2013, [ECR] I-00000 (not reported) 
22 Ibid., 68. 
23 Ibid., 69. 
24 C. Willett, (2007), 2. 
25 Ibid., 49. 
26 Ibid., 2. 
27 R. Brownsword, G. Howells, T. Wilhelmsson, 33, 40. 
understood the term, if the consumer was able to influence it, and if the consumer had a 
choice between different alternative terms.28   
One element of the test, the significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
relates to substantive fairness,29 but the other, good faith, can have both procedural and 
substantive aspects. Namely, according to Recital 16 UCTD the principle criteria for 
determining the unfairness of a term is the “overall evaluation of the different interests 
involved” which could imply procedural and substantive fairness. However, while making the 
assessment of good faith ”particular regard shall be head” to different circumstances in 
relation to the contract conclusion (e.g. strength of bargaining positions). This arguably 
implies procedural fairness. The provision goes further, saying that the requirement of good 
faith may be satisfied when the business “deals fairly and equitably” with the consumer. This 
could be said to include transparency (procedural fairness) as a basic requirement.30 However, 
as transparency is not mentioned in the recital, good faith plausibly also refers to (building on 
the significant imbalance/detriment question) unfairness in substance.31 Hence, Recital 16 
UCTD most likely suggests that the good faith is concerned with both procedural and 
substantive fairness. It is unclear if the CJEU confirms this interpretation. In Aziz v 
Catalunyacaixa, the only case expressly ruling on the meaning of the two general clauses in 
the test of fairness, the CJEU gave a more substantive meaning to good faith. The fact that the 
CJEU failed to expressly comment on procedural aspects of good faith can lead to two 
opposing conclusions. One is that as the CJEU specifically mentions the phrase “dealing 
fairly and equitably” and the process of contract conclusion, the CJEU impliedly included 
procedural fairness into the scope of good faith. The other is, failing to expressly point out 
procedural aspects of good faith, bringing the principle only in connection to significant 
imbalance, the CJEU sees good faith as a principle contributing only to enquiries into 
substantive fairness. On this latter reading, as both general clauses aim toward substantive 
fairness, it could be inferred that the UCTD is primarily concerned with substantive fairness, 
i.e. the contract term should be fair in its substance.  
Therefore, we can see that the issue remains unclear, yet it is an important issue. If 
significant imbalance was the only requirement (violation of good faith being part of it) it is 
fairly clear that the contract term would only need to be unfair in its substance in order to be 
                                                 
28 P. Nebbia, 149. On the difference between procedural fairness and culpa in contrahendo see: H. Beale et al, 
Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law, Hart publishing, Oxford-Portland-Oregon 2002, 237-240. 
29 H. Collins, „Good Faith in European Contract Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1994, 249. 
30 This is the standpoint of UK courts, but the view is present in other jurisdictions as well, e.g. France. See: C. 
Willett, (2007), 112-113. 
31
C. Willett, (2011), 364. 
declared unfair, and the issue of the relationship between procedural and substantive fairness 
would not arise. But, if significant imbalance and violation of good faith are separate 
requirements (what seems to be suggested by the CJEU in Aziz v Catalunyacaixa), than the 
questions are: can the lack of procedural fairness make a term unfair where, otherwise, there 
would be no sufficient unfairness in substance; and can procedural fairness legitimize 
substantive unfairness. These issues will be further tackled when talking about the role of 
transparency. 
In Serbia, both the “significant imbalance” and “good faith” are present as overarching 
principles of Serbian contract law. The “predecessor” of “significant imbalance”, the principle 
of equality of contractual rights and obligations in Article 15 LOA goes into the heart of 
contracts. It aims to establish the contractual balance between the parties’ rights and 
obligations, and is concretized by more specific legal institutions like laesio enormis, usury 
and clausula rebus sic stantibus.32 The principle therefore without a doubt has a substantive 
meaning. The equivalent of the principle of good faith is laid in Article 12 LOA, according to 
which provision, the parties must act respecting the principle of good faith and honesty in 
concluding and performing contracts. This could imply both procedural and substantive 
fairness, i.e. acting fairly and honesty in the process of contract conclusions and in the process 
of its performance, but also incorporating terms into the contract that are substantively fair. 
Hence, the principle of good faith sets objective standards of ethical behaviour, in accordance 
with good morals, fairness and justice, which most probably has both substantive and 
procedural aspects.33  
Contrary to the UCTD, the CPA solves the saga of the relationship between the two 
general clauses, and sets “good faith” and “significant imbalance” as separate bases for 
determining the fairness of contract terms, in Articles 46(2)(5) and 46(2)(1) respectively. The 
potential problem with the CPA may be that the test is not clear as to whether the conditions 
laid down in Article 46(2) CPA should be read alternatively or cumulatively. Most probably 
even though cumulation is possible, e.g. terms that cause significant imbalance in the parties’ 
                                                 
32 For analysis ee: J. Szalma (Salma), „The principle of equivalence and laesio enormis in contracts” (Načelo 
ekvivalentnosti i prekomerno oštećenje u obligacionopravnim ugovorima), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u 
;ovom Sadu, 1977, 273-282; J. Szalma (Salma), Law of Obligations – general part, main principles, contracts 
and delicts (Obligaciono pravo – opšti deo, osnovna načela, ugovori i prouzrokovanje štete), Faculty of Law, 
Novi Sad 2009, 367-383. 
              33 See on meaning of good faith: J. Szalma (Salma), „The principle of good faith” (Načelo savesnosti i poštenja), 
Glasnik advokatske komore Vojvodine, 5/1982, 1-31, 1982, p. 23-29; see also: M. Szűcs (Sič), “Eternal values of 
Roman Law” (Trajne vrednosti rimskog prava), Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, 3-4/2006, 393-397; 
Commentary on Article 12, Commentary on Law of obligations act, Book 2 (Komentar Zakona o obligacionim 
odnosima, Knjiga 2) (ed. S. Perović), Savremena administracija, Belgrade 1995. 
 
rights and obligations are also contrary to the principle of good faith, it is not (or it should not 
be) the correct reading of the test. Cumulative interpretation would significantly narrow down 
the scope of the test, as in order to find terms to be unfair a number of conditions would have 
to be satisfied, both substantive and procedural. Moreover, the model of the CPA expressly 
sets the conditions alternatively.34 Hence, if the test is read alternatively, it is enough if terms 
are in conflict with one of the principles, i.e. it they cause significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations or are contrary to the principle of good faith. Having the principles as 
separate basis shows the probable intention of the drafters that no matter how the principle of 
good faith is interpreted, i.e. if it is given a more procedural or a more substantive meaning, 
procedural fairness is not capable of legitimizing substantive fairness, and procedural 
unfairness alone is capable of making the contract term unfair.  
 
II.2. PERFORMA1CE SUBSTA1TIALLY DIFFERE1T FROM 
LEGITIMATELY EXPECTED 
 
Closely linked to the principles of good faith and significant imbalance is the concept 
of legitimate expectations of a consumer regarding the performance of the contract (Article 
46(2)(3) CPA). This concept is not expressly present in the UCTD, although it was 
incorporated in its earlier drafts.35 Hence, as Willett points out, it must have been anticipated 
by the drafters of the current version of the UCTD that the concept of legitimate expectations 
would be relevant.36 
Legitimate expectations, as an English law concept, arose from administrative law 
where it applies the principles of fairness and reasonableness to the situation where a person 
has an expectation or interest in a public body retaining a long-standing practice or keeping a 
promise.37 Similarly, in private law, Micklitz and Wilhelmsson developed a “right to the 
protection of legitimate expectations” that should be implemented by mandatory contract or 
tort law rules.38 
                                                 
34 Article 24  Consumer Protection Act of the Republic of Slovenia  
35Article 3(1) Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, COM (1992) 
66 final SYN 285. 
36 C. Willett, (2007), 269. 
37 P. P. Craig, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community Law”, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 1996, 290. 
38 N. Reich, “The Consumer as Citizen – the Citizen as Consumer – Reflections on the Present State of the 
Theory of Consumer Law in the EU”, 10, http://www.iaclaw.org/Research_papers/melangescalais2ok.pdf, last 
visited 29 June 2013. As the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not expressly provide this 
right, consumers right to legitimate expectations is provided by reading together secondary and primary law, by 
The concept of legitimate expectations is based on mutual rights of contracting parties, 
and their optimal balance. On one hand, businesses have a right to access to free trade, the 
right to use freedom of contract to shape their position in contractual relations, on the other 
hand, consumers have a right to be fully informed of their rights, to be able to withdraw from 
the contract, and to have the necessary remedies to secure the enforcement of their rights.39  
As Willett points out40 legitimate or reasonable expectations might relate to the 
content and aim of the contract, in cases where consumers have certain expectation regarding 
performance. This might be relevant where terms allow, e.g. variation of price or 
performance, i.e. variations from what the consumer reasonably expected. 
Hence, the concept of legitimate expectations has both substantive and procedural 
dimensions. On one hand, it encompasses a right to have information on rights and remedies 
(procedural dimension); on the other, in performance of contracts consumers should be 
guaranteed the “headline” performance that they reasonably expect, and not receive a varied 
performance allowed for by standard terms (substantive dimension). 
Explicitly incorporating legitimate expectations into the test of fairness raises the level 
of protection. As the concept was unknown to Serbian contract law until the CPA it is 
essential to determine the necessary preconditions for the operation of this concept. 
First, it is important that that performance is substantially different from what is 
expected. What “substantially” means is a practical question, but minor discrepancies would 
not be sufficient. 
Second, it is important that the expectation of the consumer is based on the default 
rules of the law, or the “headline” performance that they reasonably expect.  
Third, the limits of the consumer’s expectations are set by reasonableness. What is 
reasonable will be determined by the help of the two closely linked principles, the principle of 
contractual balance in the parties’ rights and obligations and the principle of good faith. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpretation. H.-W. Micklitz, N. Reich, P. Rott, Understanding EU Consumer Law,  Intersentia, Antwerp-
Oxford-Portland 2009, 27-28. 
39 H.-W. Micklitz, “Social Justice in European Private Law”, Yearbook of European Law, 1/1999, 178. 
40 Ibid. 
II.3. PERFORMA1CE BURDE1SOME WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE 
REASO1 
 
Closely linked to the above forms of unfairness, there is a ground for unfairness in 
Article 46(2)(2) CPA stipulating that a contract term will be unfair if it causes the execution 
of the contract to be burdensome to the consumer without a justifiable reason.  This base for 
finding terms unfair is not present in the UCTD. Moreover, the UCTD is limited in its 
application at the time of contract conclusion (Article 4(1) UCTD). If circumstances change 
after the contract is concluded, they will be irrelevant to the test of fairness. Therefore, the 
UCTD is not flexible to accommodate the new concept in contract law, the concept of “social 
force majeure”, as emerged in some Nordic countries.41 Social force majeure means “social 
obstacles to performance” obstacles emerging due to changed circumstances like 
unemployment or illness, which are although not completely unforeseeable, are not 
attributable to the consumer’s fault. The following cumulative conditions have to be fulfilled 
for the operation of this concept:  
1) the consumer is affected by some special occurrence affecting its family 
life, heath, employment or anything else; 
2) there is a causal connection between the occurrence of a special event and 
the consumers payment difficulties (problems in performance of the 
contract); 
3) the consumer was not in a position to foresee the occurrence of the event; 
4) the occurrence of the event cannot be attributed to the consumer’s fault.42 
Although the concept was developed primarily in the context of financial services and 
overindebtedness, according to Wilhelmsson it might lead in the future to a more open-ended 
interpretation of the test of fairness, allowing an additional reassessment of the fairness of the 
contract term at a later point, during performance of the contract, taking into account social 
values and general consumer welfare.43   
The CPA does not mention the moment for assessing fairness within the test of 
fairness, despite being familiar with it.44 Moreover, Article 46(3) CPA took the circumstances 
                                                 
41 T. Wilhelmsson, „’Social Force Majeure’: A New Concept in Nordic Consumer Law”, Journal of Consumer 
Policy, 1990, 3-7. 
42 Ibid., 7-8. 
43 This is already the case in Nordic Countries. T. Wilhelmsson, Control of Unfair Contract Terms and Social 
Value: EC and Nordic Approaches, Journal of Consumer Policy, 3-4/1993, 450. 
44 Conformity of goods (Article 51 CPA); package travel (Article 99 CPA). 
to be taken into account when interpreting the test of fairness from Article 4(1) UCTD, 
although not following the UCTD in insisting on focusing on the moment of contract 
conclusion. Therefore, the conclusion would be that the moment of contract conclusion is not 
a decisive for applying the test of fairness in Serbian law. Nevertheless, Karanikić-Mirić 
asserts, taking into account the UCTD and the internal logic of absolute nullity in the LOA, 
the time for determining fairness should be the moment of contract conclusion.45 However, 
even if this view is accepted, there are exemptions from the rule.  
The wording of Article 46(2)(2) CPA exactly suggests the provision relates to terms 
which do not look unfair on their face, or were not unfair at the moment of contract 
conclusion, but become such during their application. Therefore, this ground for determining 
the fairness of contract terms comes into play during the performance. Additionally, 
traditional contract law tools of force majeure46 and clausula rebus sic stantibus47 could be of 
help in accommodating social force majeure.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 M. Karanikić-Mirić, (2010), 144. 
46 The LOA does not incorporate the force majeure as a separate legal principle, but at certain instances it does 
refer to special circumstances that could not have been foreseen, avoided or eliminated (e.g. Article 684 LOA). 
In legal theory force majeure is considered different from casus (circumstances that could not have been 
foreseen, and therefore avoided).  It is a qualified casus, the emphasis being on extraordinary character of 
circumstances, and not so much on their foreseeability. The important is that the circumstances could not have 
been objectively and absolutely avoided, even if foreseeable. Force majeure makes the performance of the 
contract impossible or extremely difficult, and frustrates the contract. See for more: J. Radišić, Law of 
Obligations – general part (Obligaciono pravo-opšti deo), Nomos, Belgrade, 2006, 230-232; S. Jakšić, Law of 
Obligations –general part (Obligaciono pravo, opšti deo), Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo 1953, 242; I. Babić, 
Fundaments of civil law – introduction to civil law and property law (Osnovi imovinskog prava – uvod u 
građansko pravo i stvarno pravo), Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2008, p. 110; Commentary on Article 137, 
Commentary on Law of obligations act, Book 2 (Komentar Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, Knjiga 2) (ed. S. 
Perović), Savremena administracija, Belgrade 1995. 
47 Clausula rebus sic stantibus is laid down in Article 133 LOA. It allows for a rescission of the contract or 
exceptionally the modification of a contract term if after the conclusion of the contract circumstances occur 
(unforeseeable at the time of contract conclusion) that make difficult the execution of the contract for one party, 
or make the contractual aim unrealizable, to an extent that it ceases to be in line with what the parties expected 
under the contract and it would generally be unfair to upheld the contract. See for more: Commentary on Article 
133, Commentary on Law of obligations act, Book 2 (Komentar Zakona o obligacionim odnosima, Knjiga 2) (ed. 
S. Perović), Savremena administracija, Belgrade 1995; M. Mićović, „Clausula rebus sic stantibus: De legel lata 
and de lege ferenda” (Kluzula rebus sic stantibus: de legel lata i de lege ferenda), Pravni život, 11/2008, 445-
455; O. Antić, Law of obligations (Obligaciono pravo), Službeni glasnik, Belgrade 2009, 416. Force majeure 
and clausula rebus sic stantibus can be applied interchangeably. For example economic circumstances that make 
the performance extremely expensive, but not impossible, are not a sufficient reason for declaring performance 
impossible, they may be enough to modify or rescind the contract due to changed circumstances. See: 
Commentary on Article 137, Ibid. 
II.4. THE ROLE OF TRA1SPARE1CY 
 
When talking about the role of transparency, the first question is what transparency 
means, the second, can transparency or procedural fairness legitimise substantive unfairness, 
and the third, can the breach of transparency rules alone make the contract term unfair.  
Regarding the meaning of transparency, Willett summarizes, that “terms are 
transparent when they are available at the point of contract; there is a reasonable opportunity 
to become acquainted with them; they are in clear, jargon free language and decent sized 
print; the sentences, paragraphs and overall contract are well structured; and appropriate 
prominence is given to particularly important terms”.48 As the ultimate aim of transparency is 
to enable the consumer to make an informed decision on entering into the contract and 
choosing the right product, Willett asserts that transparency has to ensure for consumers a real 
chance to understand the content of the terms.49 Since understanding depends on a number of 
additional factors like education and intelligence,50 transparency means terms should be 
formulated and explained in such matter that provide an opportunity for understanding of 
particular terms, and to allow the overall estimation of a contractual position of the consumer 
(regardless whether actual understanding in achieved).  In this sense it is clear that businesses 
are obliged to disclose some information and actually other matters. Sometimes general 
presentation of the terms might not be enough, but businesses have to take additional steps, 
and specifically draw the attention of the particular consumer to a particular term.  
The principle of transparency is laid down in Article 5 UCTD, according to which: 
“[i]n the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, 
these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language.” Due to the formulation of 
the provision, the reach of the principle and its content is uncertain. At first sight it suggests a 
purely formal control i.e. clear and comprehensible language of contract terms, without any 
further obligation of the business towards a consumer in order to ensure the consumer had real 
opportunity to understand the terms. However, if Article 5 UCTD is read together with Article 
3(1) UCTD, where transparency relates to procedural fairness as part of the general 
requirement of good faith and the test of fairness, this would mean more than clear and 
comprehensible language. Talking about the function of transparency, the European 
                                                 
48 C. Willett, (2011), 357. 
49 Ibid., 384. 
50 Experience shows that information is more utilized by “affluent, well-educated, middle-class consumers.” G. 
Howells, “The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information”, Journal of Law and Society, 
3/2005, 356. 
Commission (hereinafter: Commission) seems to confirm this position. First, by reading 
Article 5 UCTD together with Recital 20 UCTD, according to which, the consumer should 
have “actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms” of the contract, transparency 
is seen as a way of vetting contractual terms at the time of contract conclusion.51  Terms that 
are not transparent, will not even become part of the contract. Second, reading together 
Article 5 UCTD and Article 3(1) UCTD the principle of transparency relates to the control of 
the content of the contract.52 The Commission further emphasizes transparency also means 
consumers should be able to obtain the necessary pre-contractual information to make an 
informed decision.53The CJEU seems to largely confirm the Commission’s interpretation. 
Going above plain and intelligible language, the CJEU interpreted Article 5 UCTD in 
connection with Recital 20 UCTD as relating to pre-contractual information on the terms of 
the contract and on the consequences of concluding the contract.54 Therefore, although the 
final reach of transparency remains undetermined, both the Commission and the CJEU seem 
to be inclined towards giving a wider meaning to transparency than plain and intelligible 
language. However, any wider meaning can only be archived by interpretation. 
The principle of transparency is given large significance in the CPA where it is 
implemented in a much wider manner. Transparency is part of the test of fairness (Article 46 
(2)(4) CPA), it is listed as a circumstance that should be taken into account in interpreting the 
test (Article 46(3)(4) CPA), and is a vetting rule (Article 44(3) CPA). Regarding the meaning 
of transparency Article 44(1) CPA asserts: “a contract term is binding for a consumer if it is 
laid down in a simple, clear and understandable language and if it would be understandable 
for a reasonable man of the consumers’ knowledge and experience.” Hence, the CPA 
expressly insists on a real opportunity of a consumer to understand the terms of the contract. 
Since understanding depends on factors like education and intelligence, the threshold of 
clarity and simplicity of language is determined compared to a benchmark consumer. The 
benchmark consumer in the CPA is such that there is a higher level of protection than the 
general European benchmark. Namely, in the absence of a specific reference in the UCTD the 
general benchmark established by the CJEU in Gut Springenheide as “an average consumer 
                                                 
51 Report on the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, COM (2000) 248 final, 27 April 2000, 17. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb AG vVerbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V., 21 March 2013, [ECR] I-00000 
(not reported), 44. 
who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect”55 applies. This 
objective standard however fails to take into account the needs of vulnerable consumers.56 
Moreover, the standard may not even work with “average” consumers as it was established in 
relation to commercial communication and achieving understanding of contract terms require 
deeper information seeking and a certain level of knowledge for an informed decision.57 In 
contrast, the CPA does take into account special vulnerability of certain group of consumers. 
Whether the terms communicated to the consumer were transparent will be determined taking 
into account the group of consumers, the “class” to which a particular consumer belongs.  
Hence, instead of an “absolutely objective” standard it relies on a “relatively objective” 
standard that might be above or below the “average”. This “relatively objective” standard is 
an exception in Serbian contract law, where the obligations of the parties are traditionally 
measured against an objective standard, standard of a reasonable man, or standard of 
reasonable businessmen.58 The fact that the standard of the reasonable man as a standard of 
behaviour for consumers is not mentioned, might suggest, that the intention of the drafters 
was exactly to prevent any attempt to make an objective estimation (as much as possible) of 
how the consumer was suppose to understand the communication of the business, fearing that 
courts would be too harsh in ruling on transparency, and aiming to develop a special 
sensitivity of courts towards consumers and their protection.  
Article 44(2) CPA further provides the business is obliged to provide a real 
opportunity for the consumer to get acquainted with the terms of the contract, with due regard 
to the means of communication used. This provision also seems wider than Article 5 UCTD. 
It insists on the result to be achieved, rather than the means used.  A real opportunity to get 
acquainted with the terms of the contract is probably wider than plain and understandable 
language of the contract. This provision most probably obliges the business to make further 
steps in drawing the attention of consumers to the terms of the contract than just laying them 
                                                 
55 C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH and Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - Amt für 
Lebensmittelüberwachung, 16 July 1998, [ECR] 1998, I-04657, 37. 
56 On the contrary, the Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, No. L 149, 11 June 2005, 22–39, implements the standard developed in Gut Springenheide in 
Article 5(2) but is also familiar with the notion of a vulnerable consumer in Article 5(3). In case of vulnerable 
consumers the benchmark is an average consumer from the vulnerable consumers’ group (Recital 19). The 
UCTD does not allow for such distinctions, but the differentiation should be extended to it. See:  Simon 
Whittaker, “Language or Languages of Consumer Contracts?”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 
2005-2006, 244. 
57 Cf C. Willett, (2007), 113-115 
58 These standards are specifically referred to in the LOA (Articles 581, 662, 714, 751). 
down in plain and simple language. Indeed, it may well oblige the business to draw the 
attention of a particular consumer to a particular term. 
The second issue related to transparency is whether it can legitimize substantive 
unfairness. If the answer is yes, this means, substantively unfair terms are considered fair just 
because they are communicated in a transparent, i.e. procedurally fair, manner. However, 
procedural fairness should not be capable of legitimizing substantive unfairness. First, 
consumers often choose not to read the contract.59 Second, even if they read the contract they 
cannot process the information adequately to make an informed decision.60  Third, even if 
they read and understand the terms of the contract, the research of behavioural economics has 
shown that an informed decision is not guaranteed as consumers are not rational in making 
choices.61 Therefore, transparency as an overriding, legitimizing factor leaves the door wide 
open for businesses to include substantively unfair terms, especially among standard terms 
and conditions. It is not clear how the UCTD solved the issue. The more protective reading of 
the test of fairness is that it primarily intends to regulate substantive unfairness, which 
consequently, cannot be legitimized by procedural fairness, but this is not the only reading of 
the UCTD. If violation of good faith is a separate requirement under UCTD (see debate 
above), then it might be argued that, if there is transparency, there is good faith, and therefore 
no unfairness, no matter the degree of substantive unfairness.62 Although the CPA does not 
deal specifically with the issue, a transparent term self-evidently does not violate the “lack of 
transparency” unfairness section, if such a term is substantively unfair it clearly violates other 
sections such as “significant imbalance” or “unjustifiably burdensome”, which are focussed 
on substantive (un)fairness.  
Finally, the third issue is whether transparency alone is capable of making a contract 
term unfair. Under the UCTD there is no explicit sanction for breach of transparency. 
According to the Commission, the infringement of the principle of transparency is not 
penalised in the strict sense of the word. The intention of the UCTD is to maintain the 
contract with the help of the contra proferentem rule, i.e. the interpretation most favourable 
for the consumer.63 However, taking the wider meaning of transparency, a contract term that 
                                                 
59 O. Ben-Shahar, “The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law”, European Review of Contract Law, 
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60 S. Grundmann, “Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract Law”, Common 
Market Law Review, 2002, 269-270; G. Howells, (2005), 350. 
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62 C. Willett, (2011), 372. 
63 Report on the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, COM (2000) 248 final, 27 April 2000, 19. 
is not communicated in a transparent manner will not become part of the contract (Article 5 
UCTD read with Recital 20 UCTD), or it will make the term unfair and therefore null and 
void (Article 5 UCTD read together with Article 3(1) UCTD). This is however subject to 
interpretation, and the only explicit sanction is the contra proferentem interpretation. On the 
contrary, in Article 46(2)(4) CPA transparency is part of the test of fairness; hence, a non 
transparent term alone is capable to make the contract term unfair. It follows, under the CPA 
procedural fairness is a valid ground for making contract terms unfair.  
 
 
III. CO1CLUSIO1 
 
 
The CPA for the first time introduced the notion of unfair contract terms in consumer 
contracts into Serbian contract law, and provides reasonably comprehensive regulation. The 
paper compared the Serbian and European tests of fairness, and highlighted the advantages of 
the Serbian test. Based on the analysis it can be concluded the Serbian test in the CPA is much 
more protective than the European test in the UCTD.  
First, it is much clearer in Serbia than under the European test that (a) terms can be 
unfair purely on the basis of procedural unfairness, including a lack of transparency and (b) 
terms can be unfair purely on the basis of substantive unfairness, i.e. that procedural fairness 
is not capable of legitimizing substantive unfairness.  
Further, it is possible in Serbian law, but not European law, for a term that is fair based 
on circumstances existing at the time of contract conclusion, to be found to be unfair based on 
(changes to) circumstances during performance. This means that there is great potential to 
accommodate the newly emerged concept of social force majeure.  
Finally, the Serbian regime is clearly more protective in not containing important 
exemptions from the test of unfairness, such as terms defining the price or main subject 
matter.64 
Therefore, it can be said, the test of fairness in CPA is an almost perfect legislative 
solution. It is very much fairness oriented, providing both for substantive fairness and 
procedural fairness apparently leaving very little room for the businesses’ freedom of contract 
and provides for a very high level of protection for consumers. However, there remain key 
questions as to how the test will be applied in practice. First, all of the above described 
                                                 
64 See Article 4(2) UCTD and the significant reduction in protection that can be caused if, as in the UK, the price 
exclusion is interpreted to include virtually all charges under the contract no matter how peripheral (Office of 
Fair Trading v Abbey ;ational Plc. [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696). 
potential for independent regulation of substantive, procedural and post contractual (or 
performance oriented) fairness can all be undermined by judges setting low levels of 
(substantive, procedural or post-contractual) fairness.65 Finally and vitally, without adequate 
enforcement mechanisms and tools good substantive law rules stay “letters on the paper,” and 
consumers remain unprotected.66  
 
                                                 
65 See C. Willett, “General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK”,  
Cambridge Law Journal, 2/2012, 419-422 on the First ;ational Bank case where the House of Lords decided 
that there would be “significant imbalance” against a bank if it could not continue to add contractual interest to a 
judgement debt awarded against a consumer (despite the argument that most consumers would reasonably 
believe that they would be clear of responsibility, as long as they paid the full amount ordered by the court over 
the required period, only to discover that a large amount of interest was  still owed on top of this).   
66 See for problems with enforcement in Serbia: A. Fejős, “The Impact of EU Norms and Policies on Consumer 
Protection Enforcement in Serbia”, Journal of Consumer Policy, 2013, 250-263. 
